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This article compares the intelligence systems of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa. Three questions drive the research: How are the national 
intelligence systems organized? How is power distributed among organizations in 
each country? What are the organizational risks? By employing Network Analysis 
to publicly-available data on intelligence agencies, collegiate bodies, and 
supervising organizations, authority relations and information flows were 
mapped. Regarding organizational configuration, similarities were found between 
India and Russia, as well as between China and South Africa. Brazil differs from 
the four countries. As for the power distribution, in Russia, Brazil, and India 
intelligence is subordinated to the government, and shows more centrality in the 
cases of China and South Africa. Finally, Russia runs the highest risk of having an 
intelligence system less able to adapt to strategic circumstances, at the same time 
being the most resilient among the five countries. Likewise, China has the highest 
risk of a single actor being able to retain information, acting as a gatekeeper. 
Network Analysis has proved to be a useful approach to promote a comparative 
research program in the Intelligence Studies field. 
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he legitimacy and performance of intelligence services continue to be as 
controversial as ever. Globalization only made matters more complicated. 
First, more actors (including business firms, nongovernmental groups, and international 
organizations) are engaging in such activities with a plethora of new technological 
resources. Second, it has become even harder to achieve a proper balance between 
security and freedom in the Digital Age. Finally, as a reminder of the international 
anarchic structure and its political constraints, intelligence services are present in both 
democratic and authoritarian countries. Along with police and the armed forces, they 
form the core of any state's coercive power. Often, one state's intelligence success is 
another state's security breach. Their best-regarded mission, however, is to provide 
specialized knowledge about threats and vulnerabilities to the benefit of the national 
security decision-making process. Their internal workings, institutional interactions, 
and externalities are the main subjects of an interdisciplinary field of research called 
Intelligence Studies. This field is closely related to similar undertakings, such as 
Strategic Studies, Defense Studies, and the International Security subfield in 
International Relations and Political Science. 
One topic of permanent interest to Intelligence Studies is the distribution of 
power among the various elements comprising contemporary national intelligence 
systems. As pointed out by Gill and Phythian (2016, p. 10), the organizational/functional 
way of looking at the intelligence services has privileged the study of the United States 
and the United Kingdom (LOWENTHAL, 2015, pp. 37-69). Even so, the study of 
intelligence has also benefited from over 20 years of comparative research (e.g. AGRELL 
and TREVERTON, 2009; BORAZ and BRUNEAU, 2007; DAVIES and GUSTAFSON, 2013; 
GILL, 2007; HASTEDT, 1991; HERMAN, 1996; O'CONNELL, 2004). Most of the progress 
has been obtained on specific issues such as legislation, professionalization, external 
control, impact of terrorism, and democratization processes (e.g. ANDREGG and GILL, 
2014; BORN and LEIGH, 2007; FARSON et al., 2008; LEMOZY and SWENSON, 2003; 
UGARTE, 2001). There are two main obstacles to advancing the comparative study of 
intelligence. The first one is empirical, as the difficulties in gaining access, dealing with 
disinformation, and official secrecy are even more restrictive when it comes to 
researching other countries. The second type of obstacle is theoretical, due to a lack of 
dialogue between organizational and interactional (behavioral) explanations of  national 
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intelligence systems' evolution (CEPIK and AMBROS, 2014; ESTÉVEZ, 2014; PHYTHIAN, 
2008). 
Therefore, the main contribution of this article is advancing comparative 
research in Intelligence Studies. Network analysis will be employed to assess national 
intelligence systems in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These five countries 
are members of the international group called BRICS, which brings together the largest 
developing economies in the world. Despite significant heterogeneity regarding military 
capabilities, threat perceptions, political regimes, diplomatic stance, and economic 
profiles, they are the most important states in the contemporary world along with the 
United States of America and its allies1. Although the BRICS are relevant actors on the 
world stage, our primary goal here is not to compare how powerful their national 
intelligence systems are, neither in contrast to the United States of America's 
intelligence community, nor in relation to each other. Instead, our task is to compare 
how power is distributed 'inside' each national system. Hence, we have tried to answer 
three questions: 01. How are the national intelligence systems organized in the five 
countries? 02. How is power distributed among specific organizations in each national 
intelligence system? 03. What are the implications of a given distribution of power to the 
system's overall organizational risk? 
We define intelligence systems as networks composed of nodes (organizations) 
and links (relations), which allows us to consider the asymmetries of authority and 
information control as indicators of power distribution in a given network. Three types 
of organizations will be analyzed: supervising (government), coordinating (collegiate 
bodies), and executing (agencies). A fourth type of organization, namely external control 
bodies (control), was not included, for brevity. The empirical data from each country 
comes from public documents, legislation, and media news. We are aware of the 
limitations imposed by using such sources. Nonetheless, graphs and adjacency matrices 
used in Network Analysis are better than traditional organizational charts to describe 
intelligence systems, because they allow for the representation of the mutual relations 
between the nodes of the network (ARMSTRONG, JOHNSON and McCULLOH, 2013, p. 
18). Moreover, once the power distribution inside the network is understood, one can 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 For discussion of the meaning and the various ways to classify the BRICS countries, see Cooper 
and Flemes (2013), Hurrell (2014), and Visentini (2013).  
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begin to explain things like organizational risk, which is a range of effects from mild 
difficulties in achieving cooperation to severe difficulties to adapt to new strategic 
challenges, resulting in potential fragmentation of the network2.  
In the next section, we explain the methods used to answer the research 
questions, including definitions, technical choices and procedures for data collection, 
calculations, results verification, and analysis of discrepancies. We then present the 
results obtained for each of the five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa). In the final section, we compare the results obtained for each country in order to 
answer the research questions and to indicate limits and challenges for the next round 
of comparative intelligence studies. 
 
Methods 
Networks are formed by nodes (also called vertices) and links (also called 
edges). The nodes can be people, cities, knowledge, resources, or any material or 
immaterial objects one chooses to analyze. In the case of national intelligence systems, 
all the nodes belong to a single class, namely, organizations. As organizations are 
collective actors, throughout the article the terms node, actor, and organization will be 
used interchangeably. For a network to exist, the nodes must be linked by means of a 
flow or relationship. The links between nodes can be directed (indicated by an arrow) or 
undirected (reciprocal). For the analysis of national intelligence systems, we considered 
both directed links (authority) and undirected links (information flows). 
By authority, we mean the hierarchical subordination exercised by an 
organization over another. As part of a contemporary state, even staff relationships 
(experts asked to provide information instead of simply being told what to do) in 
intelligence happen in a bureaucratic and at least partially formal setting. In turn, the 
information flows between organizations were assessed according to formal reporting 
obligations, common membership, or otherwise indicated by country specific sources. 
Together, authority and information flows amount to a relational definition of power 
(HANNEMANN and RIDDLE, 2005, p. 60). In other words, power stems from the position 
of an actor in the network. This position is determined by the number and the intensity 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2 According to the hypothesis proposed by Cepik and Ambros (2014), one of the variables that 
affect the learning capacity and the evolution of national intelligence systems is the degree of 
functional differentiation (division of labor) observed in each country.  
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of subordinate relationships that the actor experiences. Moreover, the actor's position is 
also determined by the number and intensity of information flows that it intermediates.   
 Analyzing data obtained from public documents and news, the authority 
exercised by each organization was rated by the authors on a scale of four intervals (0, 
03, 06, and 09). The intensity 09 indicates relations provided for by law and deemed 
effective; that is, authority to request others to collect and analyze information or act 
upon it which is both legally sanctioned and carried out without any significant 
insubordination. Authority relationships with intensity 06 are those provided for by law, 
but in which there are limitations on the observed degree of subordination, either in 
specific subjects or time periods. A level 03 of authority is one provided by law, but 
characterized by significant insubordination or leeway. It can also represent a situation 
where the organization is legally subject to a particular actor, but informally it is another 
actor who effectively subordinates it. It can also express a reversal of the direction of 
command. We apply '0' when no relationship exists between organizations, or when it is 
irrelevant to the functioning of the national intelligence system. 
The same scale was used to rate the intensity of information flow. Relations in 
which the intensity was classified as 09 are those where the information flow is 
provided by law and where there is evidence that it is effective between two nodes in 
the network. In turn, intensity 06 indicates an information flow provided by law, but 
ineffective for various reasons (low sharing rates, competition between agencies, 
administrative rules of compartmentalization, etc). An intensity 03 was attributed to 
information flows that are not provided legally, but in which there is evidence of its 
existence between two actors. We apply '0' when there is no relevant flow of 
information between two nodes in the network.  
The primary data about intelligence services is qualitative in nature and has 
been acquired from public sources, such as official documents, legislation, books, 
articles, and news3. Deciding which organizations make up a national intelligence system 
in the case of the BRICS countries presents some difficulties (ANDREGG and GILL, 2014, 
p. 488). When available, legal definitions determine which organizations are part of the 
national intelligence system. When there was no legal basis to decide on the system's 
components, we have used the thematic proximity of an organization to national 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3 The specific sources for each country are referred throughout the article. 
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security matters to include it or not. Thus, many organizations dedicated to criminal 
intelligence activities, especially at the local level, were not included in the network. 
Similarly, private and non-governmental organizations were excluded, even as we 
recognize the growing importance and the need for additional research on them (KEEFE, 
2010, pp. 296-309). Task forces, fusion centers, and working groups were also excluded 
from the network. We are aware of their increasing importance in many places. 
However, their temporary and sometimes 'ad hoc' nature makes it difficult to even 
compile enough information at this point. In the case of police, military, and 
constabulary forces scattered throughout the territory and with very complex divisional 
systems, we decided to group them by functionality and subordination at the national 
level (see Country Results). All network nodes belong to the same class (organizations), 
but they were classified into three major types: supervising (government), coordinating 
(collegiate bodies), and executing (agencies). As mentioned before, we are still collecting 
data about a fourth type of organization very relevant in intelligence systems, namely 
external control organizations (parliamentary committees, special courts, etc).  
Once the organizations that form a country's national intelligence system have 
been established, we have also weighted the intensity of a certain relationship between 
any two given organizations inside that system. For instance, the authority relationship 
between a collegial organization (coordination) and the other nodes of the network was 
classified as intensity 09 only when a organization member of the collegiate body had 
the power to dissolve the collegiate, combining both coordinating and commanding 
roles. In other cases, this type of node always had its authority relations classified as 
grade 06. The authority relationship of the head of state with other nodes of the 
governmental supervising and directing organizations (government) type were 
classified with intensity 09 with the exception of some cases, based on evidence and 
explained in the text. Finally, although task forces, fusion centers, and working groups 
have not been included per se as nodes in the network, their existence was considered in 
view of the intensity atributed to the information flow relations between participating 
nodes of the task force. 
Once all components of a national intelligence system (the network nodes) were 
identified and classified, their mutual relationships were recorded in two matrices, one 
for the relations of authority and others for the information flows. Adjacency matrices 
are one way to represent a network. In them, the same actors (or network nodes) are 
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arranged in two axes, with rows and columns forming a square. In the cells of the matrix 
every relationship between two actors is recorded according to their intensity scale. 
Obviously, diagonal cells which cut the array in half (relating each actor to itself) are 
filled with '0'. The matrices are the basis for recording data, generating graphs, and 
performing calculations4. All work has been carried out with the help of ORA software 
(Organizational Analyzer) developed by the Center for Computational Analysis of Social 
and Organizational Systems (CASOS) of Carnegie Mellon University5. 
In order to answer the research question on the power distribution in each 
national intelligence system, two different centrality indexes were calculated for each 
node. According to Brandes and Erlebach (2005, pp. 92-95), different centrality indexes 
allow for the observation of different aspects of power relations in a network6.   
The Degree Centrality index, for example, is defined as the number of links 
between a node and the others, i.e., how connected is a node. In directed graphs, such as 
those generated by the authority matrix, we have two measures of centrality, one 
computing relations in which the actor is being subordinated (in-degree), and other 
relations in which the actor is subordinating another (out-degree). Therefore, the 
Degree Centrality is a composite index, which can be decomposed into in-degree, out-
degree, and total degree measures. The higher the relative distribution of connections a 
node (organization) has, the less dependent it becomes on any other specific node 
(FREEMAN, 1979).  
In turn, the Betweenness Centrality index is obtained by computing the number 
of times a given node intermediates the relationship between other nodes in a geodesic 
path (i.e., the shortest path between two nodes). This index allows us to evaluate which 
nodes (actors) are in the position of stakeholders, that is, who have the power to 
withhold information within the network and the potential to break or prevent 
relations, in fact isolating other actors (ARMSTRONG, JOHNSON and McCULLOCH, 2013; 
HANNEMAN and RIDDLE, 2014).  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Graphs (G) are abstract objects formed by a set V of vertices (or nodes) and a set E of edges (or 
links). That is, G = (V, E).  Graph theory and relational algebra are the mathematical basis of the 
Network Analysis area. Other important methodological foundations are the Statistics and 
Computational Algorithms (BRANDES and ELERBACH, 2005). 
5 Cf. http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/software.php. Other network analysis software 
do exist. See Huisman and Van Duijn (2011). 
6 Further discussion about the insufficiency of centrality indexes to measure power to be found 
in Borgatti (2005). 
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First, each centrality index (Degree and Betweenness) was calculated separately 
for each node (organization) in the network. Then, the results were normalized on a 
scale between 0 and 100, thereby equalizing the size of different national intelligence 
systems, which is technically called the network diameter. Normalization was achieved 
by adding the indexes obtained for each actor and then dividing the individual index of 
each actor by the value of the sum of all them. Finally, the normalized indexes were 
compared to establish the relative position (power) of each actor in the network. 
Henceforth, the method combines qualitative and quantitative steps. Qualitative steps 
are crucial and drive the process, although deciding upon the proper indexes and 
provide calculations is an important part of the methodology as well.  
To answer the research question concerning the organizational risk of a 
national intelligence system due to a particular distribution of power, two additional 
indexes were used, in accordance with McCulloh, Armstrong and Johnson (2013, pp. 
205-234). Remember that by organizational risk we mean the probability that the 
system's internal power distribution will produce a range of effects from mild 
difficulties in achieving inter-agency cooperation to severe difficulties to adapt to new 
strategic challenges, resulting in potential fragmentation of the network. Unfortunatelly, 
the methodology cannot establish which effects will follow or how the respective 
national government will respond to such difficulties7. Also, it is important to notice that 
Network Analysis literature uses similar names for the additional indexes. Although it 
can be a bit confusing, just remember that while the previous indexes were calculated 
for each node of the network, these two new indexes are applied to the network as a 
whole (graph level analysis).  
The Degree Centralization index indicates the existence of nodes 
(organizations) very central in the network. Such nodes, if removed, would lead to the 
dispersion of the others. The calculation of Degree Centralization was applied to the 
authority relations. This index is measured on a scale from 0 to 01. The closer to zero 
(0.00), the more resilient, or less prone to fragmentation a network is. One important 
caveat is the fact that being more resilient can also mean being less able to adapt to new 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7 According to Cepik and Ambros (2014, pp. 550-551), organizational risk in this sense is 
conducive to institutional crises, which tends to be more recurrent in the intelligence realm than 
in other areas of government due secrecy, lack of proper external controls, as well as low 
functional differentiation. 
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strategic challenges8. Therefore, the exact meaning of a particular index requires 
additional qualitative analysis to be established.  
The Betweenness Centralization index indicates how evenly the information is 
distributed on the network. It is also measured on a 0 to 01 scale. The calculation of 
Betweenness Centralization was applied to the information flow graphs. The closer to 
zero (0.00), the better the information is distributed. Obviously, due to security reasons, 
in the case of national intelligence systems a totally equal dissemination of information 
across the network is not necessarily desirable or possible. On the other hand, the closer 
to one (1.00) in terms of Betweenness Centralization, the higher the risk that a single 
node organization can retain all the information, acting as a gatekeeper on the network. 
We have calculated each centralization index (Degree and Betweenness) 
separately. As the two indexes are already expressed on a scale between 0 and 01, it was 
not necessary to perform the standardization process. In the following sections one 
finds the preliminary results for the national intelligence systems of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa9. 
 
Brazil 
Created in 1999 by Federal Law 9.883, the current Brazilian Intelligence System 
(SISBIN) has been characterized by organizational continuity and recurring institutional 
crises (BRANDÃO, 2010; CEPIK, 2005; CEPIK, 2007;  GONCALVES, 2014). One reason for 
that is the preference in Brazilian legislation to use broad definitions of intelligence and 
threats (CEPIK, 2003, pp. 207-212). Although a less than explicit definition of what is 
intelligence about is quite common in many countries (the United Kingdom, for 
example), two institutional consequences of this choice in the case of Brazil are the high 
inclusiveness of the Brazilian intelligence system and the difficulty in defining missions 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8 As Russell Swenson called to our attention (e-mail to the authors), "greater resiliency, in more 
cultural terms, could also imply that no hegemon exists among members of the system that 
would insist on other organizations becoming adaptive to new situations or threats. That is, each 
bureaucratic unit is able to maintain its old habits, even if less productive than before". 
9 Besides, two types of annexes can be found as online supplements on the Brazilian Political 
Science Review website. First, tables for each country detailing the names of all organizations, 
their types (government, coordination, agency) and the values of both indexes (Degree and 
Betweenness). Second, graphs (one for each country) where the nodes colored in red are type 01 
organizations (government), the nodes colored in green type 02 organizations (coordination), 
while the blue ones are type 03 organizations (agencies). Although it is not possible to visualize 
each link individually, the darker the color of the edge the more intense is the relationship of 
authority or communication. 
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focused on the provision of national security10. In total, the Brazilian national 
intelligence system included 22 supervising and directing organizations (government), 
05 collegial bodies (coordination), and 23 intelligence organizations (agencies)11. 
In Brazil, the president has the highest level of formal authority over the system 
(a Degree Centrality of 22.37). The actor with the second-highest level is the Ministry of 
Justice (7.34). In part, this results from the fact that the president directly subordinates 
all other governmental supervising and directing organizations (government). Since the 
Brazilian system is very inclusive, many of these organizations do not have intelligence 
activities as their primary mission. A critical node is the Brazilian Intelligence Agency 
(ABIN). Designated by law as the intelligence system center, its leadership in SISBIN is 
hindered by issues related to budget, priority and focus of its primary mission, as well as 
personnel and administrative authority. Since 2002, ABIN has been placed under the 
authority of the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) of the presidency. As much for its 
intermediate position in the chain of command between the presidency and ABIN as for 
its participation in many collegial organizations for coordination (coordination), the GSI 
accumulates great power in SISBIN12. While the Degree Centrality of ABIN is 1.74, the 
same index in the case of GSI reaches 3.84. To increase sectoral coordination, preserve 
autonomy, and develop specific doctrines for military intelligence and public security 
intelligence, new collegial organizations were created in the early 2000s for 
coordination, such as the Defense Intelligence System (SINDE) and the Subsystem of 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10 In addition to the Law 9,883/1999, the organization and the functioning of SISBIN are 
regulated by Decree 4,376/2002. The Decree 8,793/2016 establishing the first ever public 
guidelines for a National Intelligence Policy was finally issued (after more than five years of 
expectations) by the interim Temer government in June 2016, in the midst of controversial 
impeachment procedures against the President elected Dilma Rousseff. Reflecting the need of 
legal and legitimacy reassurances in times of vicious political turmoil, the new National 
Intelligence Policy limits itself to reiterate the strict adherence of Brazilian intelligence activities 
to the Constitutional principles. Of much more positive consequence – if it ever overcomes the 
National Congress maze - is the Law Project (Bill) 3,578/2015, introduced by Representative Jô 
Moraes (PCdoB/MG) to regulate ABIN's operational procedures and judicial control of secret 
intelligence collection in the country. 
11 The Public Prosecutor's Office (MP) is the Brazilian body of independent public prosecutors at 
both the federal (Ministério Público da União) and state level (Ministério Público Estadual). The 
intelligence roles played by specific organizations inside the MP seems to be increasing, but they 
were not included this time because they are not an official part of SISBIN. 
12 The Director of ABIN is a civilian who has to go through confirmation hearings of his name in 
the Senate, while the Minister of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) has been an officer of the 
Armed Forces appointed by the President of Republic. This arrangement is problematic for the 
democratic functioning of the intelligence in Brazil (ROTH, 2009). 
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Public Security Intelligence (SISP). Respectively, the Ministry of Defense (5.24) and the 
Ministry of Justice (7.34) have a high degree of centrality due to their roles in these 
subsystems13. The Ministry of Finance, in turn, also has a high centrality index (4.89), 
which indicates a tendency for the institutionalization of a subsystem of financial 
intelligence in Brazil. 
Regarding the control of information flows, ABIN stands out with a 
Betweenness Centrality of 32.3. Although it has a low Degree Centrality index, this 
organization has links with most actors that provide links with other actors, having in 
fact the shortest geodesic path and the most obvious one as shown by information flow. 
Therefore, ABIN has power in the system not because of the number of organizations it 
subordinates, but for its role in the information flow. Given the density of the network, 
ABIN cannot position itself as a gatekeeper, i.e., as an actor that may impede the 
information flow14. 
In sum, power is highly concentrated in the Brazilian National Intelligence 
System, even if the system itself is not very powerful due too its excessive inclusiveness 
and lack of effective external control. Only a few actors hold the majority of power 
resources (authority and information), among them the president, ABIN, and the 
Ministers of Institutional Security, Finance and to a lesser extent, Justice, and Defense. 
 
Russia 
Since the end of the USSR, the structure of the Russian national intelligence 
system has oscillated in accordance with changes in state capacity, threats to national 
interests, and the availability of resources. Since Vladimir Putin's presidential election in 
2000, the legacy of Boris Yeltsin has been reverted. Instead of fragmentation and 
weakening of the intelligence services came a period of increasing power and more 
resources, especially following the Second War in Chechnya (1999-2009). There was a 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13 Originally, ABIN exercised the SISP coordination function. One of the reasons for the transfer 
of responsibility to SENASP was the existence of operational problems and disputes between 
ABIN and Ministry of Justice. Still, the SENASP itself finds resistance from the Federal Police, 
which, in turn, also presents difficulties in cooperation with other state police (CEPIK, 2005). 
14 A finding that reinforces recent studies on the development of intelligence systems in Brazil is 
the high Betweeness Centrality (7.3) of the Operations and Management Center of the 
Amazonian Protection System (CENSIPAM). Created in 2002 with a focus on a critical region for 
the security and the development of Brazil, the Center provides joint experience for actors from 
different parts of the system and focuses on results, stimulating inter-agency cooperation. See 
Marques (2016) and Cerávolo (2014). 
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reduction in the number of intelligence organizations, replacement of several directors, 
and expansion of operational capabilities, missions and technology base (GALEOTTI and 
SHUMATE, 2013; SOLDATOV, 2008). More recently, despite the crisis in Ukraine and 
increased tension with the European Union and the United States, the expansion of the 
Russian intelligence system was put in check by the economic crisis15. The legal basis for 
the functioning of the Russian intelligence system is a set of laws passed in February 
2006 (On Counteraction of Terrorism; On Operational Search Activity; On Security), 
which applies to all the country's intelligence organizations. They complement specific 
laws called 'On the Federal Security Service' (May 1995) and 'On External Intelligence' 
(December 1995). There are other laws, decrees and presidential directives. According 
to Soldatov (2008), major reforms in the Russian secret services did not occur because 
of September 11, but because of the attack of insurgents in Ingushetia in June 2004. In 
total, the adjacency matrix (and the resulting graph) of Russia's national intelligence 
system included 06 governmental supervising organizations (government), no collegial 
bodies (coordination) and 07 proper intelligence organizations (agencies). 
In the case of authority relations within the Russian intelligence system, the 
president has the highest Degree Centrality (36.84). After the 2006 reforms, the 
president concentrated even more authority, directly subordinating most organizations 
in the Russian network. Despite the Federal Security Service (FSB) being considered a 
central actor, its Degree Centrality index of 3.95 is lower than the Federal Service for 
Technical and Export Control (FCTEK) (5.26) and equal to organizations such as the 
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Federal 
Protective Service (FSO), Directorate for Military Topography (VTU), or even the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the prime minister. Besides the president, the 
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (13.16) and the Ministry of Defense (9.21) have high 
centrality in the Russian system. 
When it comes to information flows, the GRU has the highest Betweenness 
Centrality (30.91) in the Russian system, higher even than the FSB (22.55). Part of the 
explanation lies in the fact that many information flows that pass through the FSB are 
informal, with intensity 03 only. In contrast, the information flows through the GRU are 
more formal and, therefore, more intense. Besides them, the FCTEK also has a relatively 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
15 Cf. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/515756.html. Accessed on February 15, 2015. 
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high Betweenness Centrality index significant (16.48). This can be explained by its role 
in information security and signals counterintelligence. This type of mission compels the 
FCTEK to maintain communication (data streams) with different actors of type 01 
(government) and some important organizations of type 03 (agencies). Finally, the 
Betweenness Centrality index of the president (14.67) is explained by the fact that he 
directly subordinates all political authorities and all agencies, except GRU and VTU, 
causing the president's office to be a natural intermediator in many relationships. 
The power distribution in the Russian national intelligence system is heavily 
concentrated in the president. Note that type 02 organizations (coordination) were not 
included in the Russian system, given the difficulties in obtaining information about the 
possible role of the National Security Council in relation to the intelligence organizations 
(agencies)16.  In addition, it is worth noting that most agencies in the system are directly 
subordinated to the president. The only two agencies that are not directly subordinated 
are the GRU and the VTU, responsible for imagery intelligence (IMINT). Both 
organizations are directly subordinated to the Chief of Staff (CGS) which, although being 
subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, is appointed by the president.  
Finally, a word about the centrality of the FSB, the organization responsible for 
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and protection of the constitution. Vladimir Putin 
was FSB director from 1998 to 1999. During most of his tenure as president, the FSB has 
strengthened and acquired more power. FSB officers have assumed key positions in the 
MDV and also went on to develop intelligence activities in the fields of SVR and GRU, 
even taking responsibility for border control (GALEOTTI and SHUMATE, 2013). 
However, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis the Russian President may promote 
reform in order to reduce the FSB's centrality in the Russian intelligence system. 
 
India 
The Indian national intelligence system is strongly guided by regional security 
challenges, but also by Delhi's objective to become a great power (CEPIK, 2009). The 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
16 See also the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK), established in 2006. It is subordinated to 
the FSB, but we could not assess if it has authority over other intelligence agencies. Within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) there is a  Commonwealth of Independent States 
Anti-Terrorism Center (CIS ATC), established in 2000 to coordinate the exchange of information 
among member countries of the institution. Cf. 
http://www.iacis.ru/eng/about/partners/partnerskie_organizatsii/antiterroristicheskiy_tsentr
_sng.  
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broad range of organizations in the system stems from three main factors, namely, the 
combination of internal security threats (insurgency and communal violence), border 
conflicts (especially with Pakistan), and regional and global ambitions (positioning 
towards China and the United States). So far, India has neither specific legislation 
regulating the operations and activities of its diversified intelligence organizations, nor 
significant external control mechanisms or congressional oversight. Therefore, defining 
the size of the intelligence system and its internal relationships becomes a challenge in 
itself (ASHTANA and NIRMAL, 2004). Fortunately, since intelligence agencies in India 
are active players in the internal political process of the country, there is considerable 
debate in the media about their role (BANERIJ, 2014). The latest reform of the system 
dates from 2002, when the Kargil Committee Report recommended changes that were 
partially implemented by 200817. In total, the adjacency matrix (and the resulting graph) 
of India's national intelligence system included 07 governmental supervising and 
directing organizations (government), 02 collegial organizations for coordination 
(coordination) and 20 intelligence organizations (agencies).  
From the authority relations point of view, it is important to highlight in the 
Indian case the Degree Centrality index of the prime minister (14.29). This can be 
explained by the PM's close working relationship to other supervising organizations 
(government), such as the Ministry of Defense (12.50) and the Ministry of Finance 
(12.50). India has intelligence agencies subordinated to the Ministry of Finance, of which 
the most important is the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB)18. Similarly, the 
Degree Centrality of the Defense Ministry is elevated because it subordinates a number 
of agencies that form a military intelligence cluster. The Ministry of Interior (Home 
Affairs) has a Degree Centrality index of 5.3, while the Intelligence Bureau's index is 
4.76. We would expect the index of the Ministry of Interior to be significantly higher 
than the of Intelligence Bureau (IB). However, the actual results reflect the double 
subordination of the agency to the minister and the prime minister, elevating the 
Centrality in-degree of the IB. The most important Indian collegial body (coordination) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
17 Created after attacks on Pakistani Kargil district of Ladakh region in 1999 and discussed the 
course of Indo-Pakistani relations since 1947, the proxy war in Kashmir, and the nuclear issue. 
The committee sought to determine whether the type of aggression occurred could have been 
anticipated by the intelligence services and what were the possible failures that allowed the 
surprise attack. Many of the proposals, however, were only implemented in 2008, after the 
attacks in Mumbai, whose authorship is still debated (CEPIK and AMBROS, 2014). 
18 Cf. http://www.ceib.nic.in /toc_1.htm. Accessed on January 16, 2015. See also Vaughn (1993). 
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should be the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). It is subordinated to the National 
Security Council (4.79) and consists of the directors of Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW) (3.57), the Intelligence Bureau (IB) (4.76), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
(1.79), the three officers of the military intelligence, a senior representative of the 
Ministry of Defense, and a senior representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, 
the JIC has a relatively low Degree Centrality index (1.79). This may indicate that the JIC 
has not been able to produce effective coordination, mainly because of its reduced  staff 
and infrequent meetings (SINGH, 2007, pp. 157-170; VAUGHN, 1993). 
Due to the system's size, Betweenness Centrality of the Indian network is 
concentrated among the system's clusters. The highest indexes are from the National 
Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which reaches 20.50 for communicating closely with 
the other agencies on the specific issue of combating terrorism. Also notable are the JIC, 
with a 13.71 index and, again, the cluster of economic and fiscal intelligence, with 
Betweenness Centralities of 13.71 (CEIB) and 9.78 (Ministry of Finance), both higher 
than that of the prime minister (8.21). Betweenness Centralities of the intelligence 
agencies (organizations of type 03), are relatively low, but significant in the case of 
defense cluster agencies, RAW (4.68), DIA (3.87), JCB (3.87), and National Technical 
Research Organization (NTRO) (3.87). 
Taken together, the distribution of authority and information flows in India's 
system indicate that power is firmly in the hands of government supervising 
organizations (government), with a limited role played by coordinating organizations 
(type 02). Also, well-defined clusters of power also exist in the area of defense, counter-
terrorism, and finance. The financial intelligence cluster demands additional research, 
but its power seems to be significant in India. The four major intelligence agencies of the 
Indian system are the IB, RAW, the NTRO, and the DIA. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), 
which is subordinated to the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC),  is the agency 
dedicated to coping with internal security threats and also the main result of the post-
Mumbai reform. The RAW is the foreign intelligence agency and its real importance for 
the state power in India seems to contrast with its relatively low indexes in terms of 
authority and information control. Both the IB and the RAW are subordinated to the 
prime minister. As they are frequently reported as having considerable autonomy, such 
discrepancies between informal accounts and formal institutional arrangements need to 
be reconciled through additional research. Finally, the two most-important military 
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intelligence agencies are the NTRO, dedicated to technical means of collection, and the 
DIA, which emulates the U.S. model of consolidating the contributions of the three armed 
forces. 
 
China 
China's national intelligence system defies classification, mainly because of its 
complexity and incommensurability in relation to United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, or even to the other BRICS countries. However, a first step should be avoiding 
to include all state and the communist party organs as 'potential intelligence 
organizations' 19. This is not to neglect the central role played by the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in the political system as well as in Chinese society. Neither to ignore that as 
a great power (similar to the United States and Russia), China probably has a very large 
intelligence system, one with specialized organizations focused on internal, regional, and 
global security issues. The deep historical continuity of the state in China, its cultural 
characteristics, or even the Soviet influence in the twentieth century should not obscure 
the fact that modern military tasks, police, foreign policy, development, and others 
demanding support from the intelligence system in China are the same found in other 
countries. This modern national intelligence system emerged along with the military 
modernization since the 1980s20. In total, our account of China's national intelligence 
system included 10 governmental supervising organizations (government), no collegial 
body (coordination) and 24 intelligence (agencies)21.  
Constitutionally, the role of President of the Republic, Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) and the Communist Party of China Secretary General 
(CPCSG) need not necessarily be held by the same person. That these roles are now held 
by one person represents a 'de facto' political and institutional arrangement. Given the 
authority relations with different network nodes, the Degree Centrality index of the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
19 This is a common error incurred by ideologically motivated observers. One example is the 
otherwise useful volume by the French journalist Faligot (2009). 
20 For the general security context see chapter 18 of Kissinger (2011), as well as Shambaugh 
(2013). Regarding the intelligence component of the military modernization in China, see Blasko 
(2006), as well as Cordesman and Kleiber (2007). 
21 After taking into consideration their specific missions, technical requirements, organizational 
dimensions, and amount of people employed, we came to the analytical decision of considering 
12 specific bureaux under the authority of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) as distinct 
intelligence agencies. Otherwise the total number of intelligence agencies in China would be 
reduced to 12 down from 24. See Guo (2012).      
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president (7.41) is higher than that of the CPCGS (5.09). In addition, both have lower 
indexes than the CMC (11.11), and an even lower index than that of the Ministry of State 
Security (MSS) (18.52). This is partially a consequence of this article's authors decision 
to consider the major departments of the MSS separately. Other important ministries are 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (4.63), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (3.24) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (2.78). As in the 
Russian case, type 02 organizations (coordination) were not identified. Given the high 
functional specialization in the network (division of labor between the nodes) and the 
large number of agencies, Degree Centralities indexes remain low for all type 03 
organizations (agencies), ranging between 1.39 and 2.78.  
Although it is very difficult to estimate the flow of information in Chinese 
intelligence, organizational system configuration indicates that most likely some 
organizations establish different degrees of communication with others. The especially 
high values for the Betweenness Centrality index of the Ministry of State Security 
(36.62) and CPC General Secretary (27.19) stand out as examples. All other nodes in the 
network show a variation in their Betweenness Centrality indexes ranging from 0 to 
5.89, including the president (2.19) and the Central Military Commission (2.86). 
Considering the performance of both indexes and similar to what is found in 
other countries, three actors (nodes) concentrate a lot of power in China's national 
intelligence system; namely, the MSS and, to a lesser extent, the president and the CMC. 
In the case of the CMC, the chain of command in the military intelligence cluster 
encompass the general departments (General Political Department [GPD]; General Staff 
Department [GSD]; 2nd  Department [GSD2]; and 3rd Department [GSD3]), and also the 
intelligence capabilities of the four singular forces in the People Liberation Army (PLA), 
namely the PLA ground forces, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Second 
Artillery Force. Notably, the intelligence capabilities of the People's Armed Police (PAP), 
the main constabular force in the country, are subordinated to both the MPS and the 
CMC. In turn, the MSS and its various departments (bureaus) correspond to an 
important cluster in Chinese civil intelligence. Finally, unlike other countries where a 
financial or tax intelligence cluster seems to be taking institutional form, in China what 
stands out is the  the growing importance of the GSCPC and MIIT. 
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South Africa 
After the defeat of the apartheid regime, South Africa's national intelligence 
system underwent two major reorganizations. In 1996, the new constitution established 
two basic principles for the democratic functioning of South African intelligence: 
coordination between agencies and civil control of their activities. In the mid-1990s, the 
Intelligence Law and the White Paper on Intelligence specified the division of 
intelligence missions in separate agencies (internal and external), with emphasis on 
external control mechanisms, coordination, supervision, and use of technical means of 
collection. In 2005, complaints related to illegal operations to intercept communications 
of ANC (the ruling party) members damaged the legitimacy of the intelligence services 
and their oversight bodies22. In 2009, the new president Jacob Zuma announced changes 
in the intelligence system, which by 2013 were guided by the General Intelligence Laws 
Amendment Act. The new structures were designed to produce administrative 
consolidation, reduce the number of agencies, and to refocus on missions strictly related 
to national security (CEPIK and AMBROS, 2014, pp. 541-545). In total, the adjacency 
matrix (and the resulting graph) of South Africa's national intelligence system included 
05 supervising organizations (government), 02 collegial bodies (coordination) and 11 
intelligence organizations (agencies). 
In terms of authority, the South African President's Degree Centrality index (18) 
is lower than that of the State Security Agency (SSA) (20). Although the president 
subordinates all ministries and is not subordinate to any other node in the network, 
making his out-degree higher than that of the SSA, the Total Degree is lower because the 
composite index considers all subordinative relations an actor is involved. As the SSA 
answers to the president and the Ministry of State Security, but subordinates the six 
branches that comprises it since the 2009 reform, its Degree Centrality is higher. All 
other organizations in South Africa's Intelligence System have Degree Centrality indexes 
ranging between 02 and 07. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
22 The Project Avani was an intelligence operation designed to assess the impact of the 
presidential Succession battle of ANC on the country's stability. As part of this project, the NIA 
intercepted e-mails from people in senior positions, who allegedly conspired to block the 
possibility of Zuma becoming the president of the ANC. The inspector general concluded that the 
emails were false and recommended disciplinary action against those responsible. The director 
of the NIA at the time (Masetlha) was dismissed by President Mbeki, as well as two senior 
officers (O'BRIEN, 2005). 
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The president has the largest Betweenness Degree in the South African case 
(38.85). This indicates that all three types of organizations communicate with each other 
through the presidency. The Betweenness Centrality index is also high for the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Committee (22.29) and the Financial Intelligence Centre 
(18.17). Although the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee's (NICOC) case is 
relevant to support the intention of transforming the committee into a major locus of 
communication between network nodes, the case of Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) 
stands out as a result of the large number of informal relationships with other 
organizations in the intelligence system. As observed in other countries, the so-called 
financial or tax intelligence cluster has grown in importance and demands further study. 
In fact, the power distribution in South Africa's national intelligence system tilts 
heavily to the president and the SSA. Besides them, we highlight the NICOC and the FIC. 
The importance of the SSA cannot be underestimated in the current configuration (post-
2009) of the South African intelligence system. This agency also concentrates corporate 
services (human resources, IT, infrastructure, logistics and finance) previously 
redundant in different agencies. It is also in charge of ensuring unity of command and 
consistency of objectives for the different branches of the intelligence activity: the 
internal, the external, and the technical. Because of the SSA's position in the network, the 
president does not directly subordinate any intelligence agency. 
Finally, a summary of the results obtained in the five countries can be seen in 
Table 01.  
 
Table 01. National intelligence systems in the BRICS group 
Country 
Unit Types Unit Indexes Network Indexes 
GOV COO AGE 
Highest 
Degree 
Centralities 
Highest 
Betweenness 
Centralities 
Degree 
Centralization 
Betweenness 
Centralization 
Unit Value Unit Value 
BR 22 05 23 PR 22.38 ABIN 32.38 0.206 0.314 
RU 06 0 07 PR 36.84 GRU 30.91 0.364 0.208 
IN 07 02 20 PM 14.29 NCTC 20.50 0.116 0.260 
CH 10 0 24 MSS 18.52 GSCPC 27.19 0.184 0.428 
SA 05 02 11 SSA 20 PR 38.85 0.159 0.394 
Source: Dataset_Cepik_Moller (bpsr.org.br/files/archives/dataset_cepik_moller) 
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Conclusions 
In this article, we have tried to answer three questions: 01. How are the national 
intelligence systems organized in the BRICS countries? 02. How is power distributed 
among specific organizations in each national intelligence system? 03. What are the 
implications of a given distribution of power to the system's overall organizational risk? 
Regarding the first question, a few commonalities and various specificities were 
observed in the cases of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. For example, 
Russia and India have civilian intelligence agencies specialized in collecting and 
analyzing intelligence about international security threats. In the cases of China (MSS) 
and South Africa (SSA), the same missions and functions are performed by specialized 
branches (bureaus) of larger organizations. Brazil is the only country in this sample with 
no major civilian intelligence agency primarily focused on external threats. Even so, the 
overall number of organizations involved in each national intelligence system is much 
higher in Brazil (50), China (34), and India (29) than in South Africa (18) and Russia 
(13).  
This alone cannot be taken as an indicator of how capable or efficient a given 
intelligence system is. For instance, Russia is a great nuclear power with advanced 
conventional weaponry and significant force projection capabilities, but has only 07 
main intelligence agencies. On the other hand, Brazil is a regional power with 23 main 
intelligence agencies. In the case of China and South Africa, we stand by our decision to 
consider specialized branches of MSS and SSA as distinct agencies for analytical 
purposes. Even so, India (20) and China (24) have similar numbers of intelligence 
agencies despite their different political regimes. One organizational feature that seems 
to be associated with a polyarchic form of government is the presence of collegiate 
bodies to coordinate different parts of the national intelligence systems. Institutions like 
South Africa's NICOC, India's JIC, and Brazil’s SISBIN Council have no equivalents in 
Russia or China.  
As for the second question, by employing node (organization) level measures of 
Degree Centrality (authority) and Betweenness Centrality (information) we were able to 
assess how power distribution varies in the five national intelligence systems. As 
predicted by theories of intelligence systems evolution, rulers (democratic and 
otherwise) create agencies to expand the surveillance and awareness capabilities of the 
state (BAYLEY, 1975; CEPIK, 2003; TILLY, 1996). However, they are probably aware that 
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creating multiple agencies helps prevent one agency from becoming too powerful and 
usurping the ruler23. Therefore, one should expect government principals to enjoy more 
power than intelligence agencies24. Whatever the political regime type (presidential, 
parliamentary, or communist), well-established states are characterized by intelligence 
subordination to the political authorities. Presidents have the highest Degree 
Centralities (authority) in Russia (36.84) and Brazil (22.38), as does the prime minister 
in India (14.29). In the cases of China and South Africa, the highest Degree Centralities 
are respectively those of the MSS (18.52) and the SSA (20).  
This is not to say that intelligence agencies are powerless. Their power comes 
from their control of important information flows (Betweenness Centrality). Besides, 
much of an intelligence agency's power comes from its attachment to a powerful 
cabinet-level sponsor. We found this feature in the case of ABIN in Brazil, FSB in Russia, 
IB and RAW in India, or the various intelligence bureaus of the Ministry of State Security 
in China. Even the now-powerful State Security Agency in South Africa is subordinated 
to a Ministry of State Security (the successor of the Ministry of Intelligence Services). 
Whenever an agency seeks to concentrate too much power, the political authority starts 
mobilizing to avoid it, as we observed in the case of Russia's FSB. The highest 
Betweenness Centrality degrees observed in the five countries were those of ABIN in 
Brazil (32.38), GRU in Russia (30.91), and NCTC in India (20.50). In contrast, in China 
and South Africa the highest Betweenness Centralities are those of the General Secretary 
of the CPC (27.19) and the president (38.85), respectively. 
Finally, we have also tried to compare the cases at graph level with respect to 
the organizational risk posed by a particular distribution of power. As a reminder, 
organizational risk is the probability that internal vulnerabilities or external threats will 
adversely affect the network. We use Degree Centralization to measure 
resilience/adaptability and Betweenness Centralization to measure information 
concentration. The respective Centralization indexes for Brazil (0.206), Russia (0.364), 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
23 Russell Swenson has called our attention (e-mail to the authors) to this particular important 
motivation for rulers to design Intelligence Systems with more than one agency. See Gill (1994) 
and also Matei and Bruneau (2011) for historical examples when an intelligence and security 
apparatus became too powerful up to a point of usurping power to itself by forming a police 
state (Brazil's SNI or South Africa's BOSS). 
24 For an institutionalist theory of intelligenge systems development, see Zegart (1999). Power-
based and insitutionalist approaches toward national security are not mutually exclusive. 
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India (0.116), China (0.184), and South Africa (0.159) indicate that Russia runs the 
highest risk of having an intelligence system less able to adapt to changing strategic 
circumstances, at the same time being the most resilient among the five countries.  
Unfortunately, one cannot say from this index how President Putin's reform 
efforts will impact Russian intelligence, or if the Ukrainian crisis will force any kind of 
institutional stress. Likewise, the respective Betweenness Centralization indexes for 
Brazil (0.314), Russia (0.208), India (0.26), China (0.428), and South Africa (0.394) 
indicate that China has the highest risk of a single actor (MSS) being able to retain most 
of the information, acting as a gatekeeper on the network. Of course, the index itself 
reveals nothing about actual tendencies or evidence of what the CMC, the president or 
the MSS intend to do. However, the current crackdown on corruption under Xi Jinping's 
rule bears watching from a Network Analysis standpoint.  
Network Analysis has proved to be a useful approach to promote a comparative 
research program in the Intelligence Studies field. So far, we were able to offer a 
systematic way of describing national intelligence systems in such relevant countries as 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It was also possible to state with some 
corroboration the existence of a causal relationship between certain organizational 
settings and a higher or lower level of organizational risk in the case of national 
intelligence systems. Aware of the Network Analysis limitations, researchers will 
continue to explore its potential. For example, by integrating more data on external 
control organizations in the legislative and judiciary branches of government. With new 
measurements and updated data, even better interpretations of results shall follow. 
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